Washington (AP) – Kiev has been a defeat for Russia for centuries. The battle for the conquerors started with a bad start and went down from there.
When President Vladimir Putin launched the war on February 24, after a month of attacks on Ukraine’s borders, he sent hundreds of helicopter commandos – the best of Russia’s special forces – to raid and capture a airports that are less guarded. At the gates of Kiev.
Other Russian forces have invaded elsewhere in Ukraine, including the eastern city of Kharkov, as well as in the disputed Donbass region and on the Black Sea coast. But as a place of national power, Kiev is the main prize. Therefore, the elite air force hit the opening hours of the war.
But Putin failed to achieve his goal of quickly destroying Ukraine’s unarmed and numerical army. The Russians were less prepared for Ukraine’s resistance, could not cope with failures, were unable to conduct air and ground operations, misjudged Ukraine’s ability to defend its airspace, and broke key military duties such as planning and execution of supplies.
“It’s a bad combination if you want to take over the country,” said Peter Mansour, a retired Army colonel and professor of military history at Ohio State University.
In any case, Putin’s forces moved from Kiev to eastern Ukraine. Eventually, the Russian leader may achieve some goals. However, his inability to capture Kiev will long be remembered, as he met his expectations before the war and revealed incredible weaknesses in an army that was one of the strongest in the world.
“It’s surprising,” said Frederick Kagan, a military historian at the Institute for War Studies, who said he didn’t know of a parallel between a large military force like Russia, which invaded the country during its election and failed.
On the first morning of the war, Russian Mi-8 attack helicopters flew south to Kiev to attack Khostomel airport on the northwestern outskirts of the capital. By taking over the airport, also known as Antonov Airport, the Russians planned to set up a base where more troops and light armored vehicles would fly into the center of the country’s largest city.
It doesn’t work that way. Several Russian helicopters were hit by missiles even before they arrived at the hostel and, after settling down at the airport, suffered severe losses from artillery.
Attempts to control Vasilkov’s military airbase south of Kiev also encountered intense resistance, and several Russian IL-76 heavy transport aircraft loaded with paratroopers were reportedly shot down by the Ukrainian defense.
When the Russians finally gained control of Hostomel airport, the fierce resistance of Ukrainians in the capital region prompted them to reconsider a plan of invasion based on the hope that the Ukrainians will quickly collapse, shake the West and relieve Russian forces. Fight.
Air strike missions beyond enemy lines, such as those conducted in a hostel, are dangerous and difficult, as the U.S. military demonstrated on March 24, 2003, when it sent more than 30 Apache attack helicopters from Iraq to Kuwait. to overthrow the Iraqi Republican Guard Division. . Along the way, the Apaches encountered small arms and anti-aircraft fire, which shot down one of the helicopters, damaged the others and forced them to interrupt the mission. However, the US military recovered from this failure and soon captured Baghdad.
The fact that the attack on the hostel of the 45th Russian Guards Special Airborne Brigade was prevented may not be highlighted in retrospect if Russia’s broader efforts have improved since then. But it did not happen.
The Russians conducted small and unsuccessful investigations in the center of Kiev, and eventually tried in large numbers to besiege the westernmost capital. Against the enormous possibility, the Ukrainians stood up and fought, stopped the Russians and effectively used a wide range of Western weapons, including Javelin portable anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles mounted on the shoulder And many more.
Last week, Russians fled Hostomel Airport as part of a major departure to Belarus and Russia.
The side light for the Battle of Kiev was the legend of a Russian supply convoy that stretched tens of miles along the main road to the capital. This was a disturbing signal for the Ukrainians at first, but they were able to attack convoy elements with limited off -road capabilities and thus eventually dispersed or became non -factor in the struggle.
“They never provided vital supplies to the Russian forces gathered around Kiev, nor did they come out to help them,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said. “The Ukrainians stopped this convoy very fast, they were very comfortable, they tore down the bridges, they hit the cars with bullets and they stopped their movements.”
Mansour said the Russians did not estimate the number of troops they would need and showed “incredible inability” to perform basic military duties. They misunderstood what it took for Kiev to win the battle, he says.
“It will be difficult even if the Russian military approves it competently,” he said. “It has been shown to be completely incapable of using modern armored vehicles.”
Putin was not the only one surprised by the initial failure of his army. The United States and other Western officials thought that if an invasion took place, Russia’s seemingly superior forces would cut through the Ukrainian army like a hot butter knife. They could occupy Kiev in a few days and the whole country in a few weeks, although some analysts wonder if Putin appreciates the Western exercises of Ukrainian forces, which intensified in 2014 after the occupation. of Putin in the Crimea and the invasion of the Donbas.
Putin could still refocus his war efforts on a narrower goal: to expand Russia’s control over the Donbass and possibly provide a land corridor from the Donbass to the Crimean peninsula. But its failure in Kiev has revealed weaknesses, suggesting that Russia is unlikely to attempt to overthrow the national capital any time soon.
“I think they learned a lesson,” Mansour said.
Source: Huffpost
