In early 2023, to develop a plan for the campaign, the Ukrainian, American and British militaries conducted eight combat simulations at a US military base in Germany.
The Washington Post has conducted the most comprehensive analysis of the Ukrainian counteroffensive yet. Published in two parts, the material is based on interviews with more than 30 Ukrainian and American officials, as well as with more than two dozen officers and soldiers on the front lines. Several officers and soldiers spoke about the military operations on condition of anonymity.
Correspondent.net The Washington Post collected the main points of the study.
How was the preparation carried out?
The WP said that in January 2023, five months before the start of the counteroffensive, the former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley visited the soldiers of the 47th Brigade, which was supposed to be the main Ukrainian “breakthrough force”. counteroffensive, on a training ground in Germany. Knowing that most of them had no combat experience, Milley told the American instructors: “Give them everything you’ve got.”
In the spring, the soldiers of the 47th returned to Ukraine, and in early May they were redeployed closer to the front line, but they were not given the order to attack. Many in the unit felt that the element of surprise had been lost and the enemy knew where the forces would come from.
The Americans urged that the counteroffensive be concentrated in one direction in the Zaporozhye region, while the Ukrainian plan included an offensive in three directions and the containment of Russian forces.
According to the plan of the Ukrainian command, the offensive went south along two different routes to the Sea of Azov, as well as to eastern Ukraine around the besieged city of Bakhmut.
Not according to plan
70% of the troops of the 47th Brigade, which led the counter-offensive and were equipped with the latest Western weapons, entered the battle with no combat experience.
On June 7, the 47th Brigade was supposed to begin counteroffensive operations to advance about 9 miles to the village of Robotino in the first 24 hours, then liberate Melitopol and cut Russian supply routes.
However, “things did not go according to plan.” The density of minefields and shelling exceeded all expectations, the losses of men and equipment were enormous, many fighters “experienced the shock of combat for the first time” and retreated to regroup, only to reenter in a bloody battle. “It’s hellfire,” said Oleg Sentsov, platoon commander of the 47th brigade.
On the fourth day, General Zaluzhny saw burned Western military equipment: American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, German Leopard tanks, and mine-clearing vehicles on the battlefield. The number of dead and wounded has weakened morale.
According to a senior Ukrainian military official, Zaluzhny ordered his troops to stop the attack until all of Ukraine’s limited weapons were destroyed.
Instead of trying to break through the Russian defenses with a massive, mechanized assault supported by artillery, as his American colleagues had advised, Zaluzhny decided to have the Ukrainian soldiers walk in small groups of 10— a process that would save equipment and lives, but would be slower.
Instead of making a 9-mile (about 14.5 km) breakthrough on the first day, the Ukrainians advanced about 12 miles (19.3 km) in depth in nearly six months since June and freed several village, wrote WP. Even Robotino was freed in less than two days, but Melitopol was still out of reach.
Disputes with the US
Ukraine’s failures on the battlefield have led to disagreements with the United States over how best to penetrate Russia’s deep defenses.
The commander of US forces in Europe did not communicate with the Ukrainian commander for weeks early in the campaign amid tensions over differing views on battlefield decisions.
Each side blamed the other for mistakes and miscalculations. The US military has concluded that Ukraine lacks basic military tactics, particularly the use of ground reconnaissance to understand the density of mines. Ukrainian officials say Americans don’t seem to understand how military drones and other technologies have changed the battlefield.
They didn’t give me a weapon?
At the end of the fall of 2022, Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin asked the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Valery Zaluzhny, what Ukraine needed for a spring offensive. He replied that he would need 1,000 armored vehicles and nine new brigades trained in Germany. According to the WP interlocutor, Austin told his colleagues that “it’s almost impossible.”
WP also wrote that, according to Pentagon estimates, Ukraine needs 90,000 or more 155mm artillery shells per month, and American production is only about a tenth of that amount.
A senior Ukrainian military official said Ukraine had received only 15% of the equipment, such as launchers for remote mine clearance. At the same time, the West at that time refused to provide Ukraine with fighter jets and long-range ATACMS missiles, and the United States did not want to transfer cluster munitions.
American officials denied that Ukraine did not receive all the promised weapons – according to them, almost two dozen MLRS, more than 40 mine trawls, 1,000 demolition charges (Bangalore torpedoes) and more than 80 thousand smoke grenades, as well the 1,500 armored vehicles.
Source: korrespondent
I am David Wyatt, a professional writer and journalist for Buna Times. I specialize in the world section of news coverage, where I bring to light stories and issues that affect us globally. As a graduate of Journalism, I have always had the passion to spread knowledge through writing.