In the summer of 2023, according to the plan of the Ukrainian command, 12 armored and mechanized brigades will make a breakthrough in an area 30 km wide.
The authoritative British security think tank RUSI published a 48-page report Preliminary lessons from Ukrainian offensive operations in 2022-23, in which it named the main reasons for the unsuccessful counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2023. Analysts also expressed doubts about a new offensive in the near future. The authors of the report are Jack Watling, Alexander Danilyuk and Nick Reynolds.
Armed Forces Plan
The authors called the initial plan reasonable: 12 Ukrainian armored and mechanized brigades should make a breakthrough in an area 30 km wide, isolate Tokmak for seven days, and then move south in Melitopol. At this rate, Russia will not have time to raise reserves, and the advancing Ukrainian troops will only have to overcome the resistance of six Russian regiments on the defensive.
Similar miscalculation
But the implementation of this plan was prevented by mistakes made6, according to the authors of the report, both by Ukraine’s allies and by the Ukrainian command itself.
In particular, RUSI said that the Western allies did not provide Ukraine with enough equipment and weapons, unlike Russia, they did not have time to transfer the industry to military flights, so they did not have enough weapons , and those given are too late. This led to the fact that the Ukrainian army had little time to master the new equipment.
Miscalculations of the Ukrainian command
The Russian command clearly knows where the direction of the main attack is, analysts say. The authors see this as an operational security failure on the part of both Ukraine and its allies.
In addition, the Ukrainian command decided to send less trained units to the breakthrough, while the more experienced ones should hold the front. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are dispersing their forces in different directions.
But the most serious mistake of the Ukrainian command, according to analysts, is that it hopes that the defending Russian troops will break and flee, as happened near Kharkov in 2022. When this does not happen, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have no -hope to lose momentum.
However, the authors did not touch on discussed factors such as the density of Russian mines and the capabilities of attack drones capable of hitting important armored vehicles with great accuracy.
New counter-offensive
Watling, Danylyuk and Reynolds believe that the continuation of Ukrainian offensive actions is impossible in the foreseeable future.
However, Ukraine can focus on causing maximum damage to the Russian army, as well as increasing attacks on Russian infrastructure that generate income for the Russian budget.
Western and American officials estimate that Ukrainian forces will remain on the defensive for the next six months and won’t be able to launch a large-scale counteroffensive until 2025.
However, the Ukrainian Defense Forces are already trying to seize the tactical initiative in some sectors of the front and will be able to conduct limited counter-offensive operations, even while on the defensive, if the availability of Western assistance allows.
Ukrainian troops are likely to increase the size and frequency of counterattacks in the coming months as Western aid comes to the fore and Ukraine continues to build reserves and new brigades, analysts said. at the Institute for the Study of War.
Source: korrespondent
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