The influential American publication Foreign Affairs published an article by Alexander Vindman, an analyst, former director of European affairs at the US National Security Council.
The article diagnoses the current hesitation of the Biden administration in supplying Ukraine with heavy weapons — so necessary for success in the counteroffensive and for victory.
The material was translated by Yevgeny Bystritsky, executive director of the George Soros International Renaissance Foundation.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fear of the spread of nuclear weapons, and then in the past three decades, assuaging Russian concerns about its security and fears that bilateral relations with the Kremlin could escalate into another cold war or, worse, into a hot war, the States have built relations with Russia through relations with Ukraine.
Because of their willingness to adjust to changes in Russia, the United States has rejected democratic progress in Ukraine since the pro-democracy movements of 2004-2005 and exploded prospects for a more fruitful long-term relationship with Kyiv.
George W. Bush, in his infamous August 1991 speech as Chicken Kyiv, refused to recognize Ukraine’s self-determination as a manifestation of “suicidal nationalism.” The speech marked the beginning of an unfortunate U.S.-Ukrainian relationship that could have been easily avoided. This stopped the ability to foresee the future danger of Russia’s geopolitical rivalry.
Along with the restoration of Russian military power, in order not to provoke Moscow, the States directly recognized the influence of Russia in relation to Ukraine in an imaginary post-Soviet geopolitical space. The US has been swayed by the myth of Russian exceptionalism and deluded by a distorted vision of bilateral relations, largely ignoring signs of authoritarian consolidation within Russia and ignoring the reservations of partners in the Baltics and Eastern Europe.
When Russia’s proclivity for authoritarianism became undeniable (in 2004 Russia interfered in elections in Ukraine, in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia), the US justified it with stability, fears of a return to Cold War tensions.
Instead of looking for partners for cooperation, US politicians continued their futile courtship with the Kremlin. As a result, they lost the opportunity to invest in the US-Ukraine relationship, which has always been a more promising driver of democratization in the region.
Opportunities were missed: to offer more than the vague “security guarantees” in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum with Ukraine’s fateful decision to renounce the nuclear weapons it inherited after the collapse of the USSR; support financially and technologically Ukraine’s reform efforts and nurture Ukrainian ambitions for European and transatlantic integration after the 2004 Orange Revolution. If that happened, today would be a different story.
Even if this had not happened, the West could have responded more strongly to the Russian invasion in 2014. A tougher response could deter further Russian aggression, or at least better prepare Ukraine for a bigger conflict. The United States and its allies helped modernize the Ukrainian army, but because they didn’t want to provoke Moscow, they refused to impose tough enough sanctions on Russia or provide heavy equipment or intensive training for Ukrainian troops. Putin still attacked. Now the West is trying to catch up.
The United States has adopted a no man’s land policy towards Ukraine. This historic failure has become more evident today as former US officials defend their policy toward Ukraine. Virtually all experts working for the US government over the past 30 years have been trained Sovietologists, not Ukrainianists. As a result, they were ill-prepared to recognize and understand Ukraine as a separate cultural, ethno-linguistic, historical and political entity. For them, the mental boundaries of Ukrainian geopolitics are still riveted to the imperial center in Moscow.
With a few exceptions (notably the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University), most US universities teach their students in Russian, with an emphasis on Russian history, culture, and literature.
Old habits die hard. In the Biden administration, the top leadership of the National Security Council acted as the spiritual successor to partisan predecessors. The Biden administration cannot seem to accept that as long as the path is in power, the best the United States can hope for is a cold war with Russia.
NSDC officials have sought to limit military support to Ukraine, based on familiar logic — that it could increase tensions with Moscow and dampen hopes of normalizing remaining relations with the Kremlin.
Although Biden, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin promised to give Ukraine all the support it needed to win the war, NSC officials blocked the transfer of Soviet-era aircraft to Ukraine, refused to provide Ukraine with enough long-range air defense, and limited the number. needed to destroy Russian targets and stopped discussing the transfer of manned and UAVs needed to neutralize Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities.
The leadership of the National Security and Defense Council believes that the war will create much greater risks for the United States and global stability if Ukraine “gains too much.”
While a key goal of the United States is to do whatever it takes to support and defend Ukraine, another key goal is to ensure that we don’t end up heading down the road to World War III,” Jake said. Sullivan, who leads the National Security and Defense Council as Biden’s national security adviser.
The Biden administration has made democratic renewal the cornerstone of its domestic and foreign policies. There is no better way to demonstrate democratic resolve than to defend US values and interests in Ukraine. A Ukrainian victory would not only limit Russia’s options for future military aggression, but would also bolster resistance to democracy in Eastern Europe, offering a powerful lesson for would-be authoritarian aggressors and democratic states alike. On the contrary, Ukraine’s loss would mean an acceleration of the wave of authoritarianism and the decline of democracy that has swept the world over the past decade.
To ensure the triumph of democracy in Ukraine, the United States must first change its thinking patterns and learn from decades of mistakes. Recognizing the venomous russo-centrism of US foreign policy is the first step towards a better approach to US-Ukrainian relations. As the Russian military effort falters and the prospect of a direct confrontation between the United States and Russia begins to look unthinkable again, it will be tempting to revert to old ways of thinking and plan for a post-Putin normalization of relations with Russia. But such an outcome will again lead to the privilege of Russia over Ukraine.
The US has never had the influence to unilaterally change Russia’s domestic politics. But there was an opportunity to achieve a more promising result with a more willing partner from Ukraine. If the States do not fundamentally reorient their foreign policy, they will lose an even greater opportunity to create a peaceful, democratic Eastern Europe.
Source: Racurs
