The first year of the Russian invasion of Ukraine: why the conflict could freeze

This is the first year since the start of Putin’s aggression against Ukraine, providing continuity – in a highly violent way – to the interventionism that has developed since 2014 after Euromaidan and the illegal annexation of Crimea.

The argumentative misconceptions that the Kremlin’s speech was drawn into to justify an unjustified and unacceptable action have been globally discredited in the face of the illegal use of armed force and encroachment on the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

The protection of the Russian minority in Donbas, which is being genocide by the Kiev authorities, the denazification of the government and Ukrainian security forces, or the violation of the Minsk agreements I and II reached by both republics in the OSCE negotiation framework were included, among other things, along with the potential entry of Ukraine into NATO.

The neo-imperialist nature of the action is associated with two elements that are essential for Russia today: the fear of democratic contamination and the impossibility of integrating Ukraine into regional projects led by Moscow, the Eurasian Economic Union and the CSTO.

evolution of war

Since February 24, 2022, we have been witnessing a war marked by a humanitarian catastrophe, with the flow of refugees to various European states, which currently exceeds eight million citizens of Ukraine, and the systematic destruction of the energy sector and the devastation of the Ukrainian economy – with a drop in GDP by more than 30%.

After an initial general offensive that seemed to aim for a quick capture of Kiev, followed by the overthrow of the Zelensky government (or his expulsion), the Russian armed forces gradually retreated until they reached a phase of conflict characterized by a stalemate in their respective positions coinciding with the winter campaign.

Western military support (EU states, the UK and the United States – the latter is worth almost $30 billion -) has allowed Ukraine to keep up with a faltering Russian army that is outnumbered in manpower and combat equipment, but which has shown noticeable shortcomings. This led to successive changes in the direction of operations until they were led by the Chief of the General Staff, General Gerasimov, the author of the military doctrine of hybrid wars, which bears his name since the publication of his work in 2013. .

Putin’s miscalculations

It seems clear that Putin has made some miscalculations. First, Kievan fortitude. Secondly, the coordinated reaction of a part of the international community helping Ukraine and imposing sanctions on Russia.

In the third direction, with his aggression, he achieved what was an essential security argument in Moscow: the expansion of NATO to the Russian borders with the addition of two traditionally neutral states, such as Sweden and Finland.

Ultimately, it had the opposite effect of what was desired in terms of identity: it strengthened the Ukrainian ethno-cultural identity from the attempt to absorb and dilute it with the Russian one, justifying the independent statehood that Putin wanted to end.

The fact of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity is being investigated. An interesting Ukrainian maneuver is taking place in the International Court of Justice against a lawsuit filed by Russia under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Barring the possibility of a crime of aggression, bringing Putin and his regime’s political and military leaders to justice before the International Criminal Court seems unlikely.

future scenarios

The development of the conflict remains uncertain. The predictions were systematically wrong. From the imminent fall of Kiev in the early days of the invasion, to the complete withdrawal of Russian troops, including Crimea, until the end of 2022, when it comes to recognizing the difficulty of understanding Putin’s true minimum goals that cannot be abandoned in this military escalation.

In the foreseeable freezing of the conflict, two important aspects may coincide. Western economic and military support may have peaked for two reasons: temporary wear and tear and the loss of media attention to the conflict are affecting civil society, which is increasingly shifting its focus away from Ukraine. In addition, the states involved border on the line separating external support from direct participation in the conflict.

For the Kremlin, the option of consolidating territorial control over the occupied regions in order to initiate a process of politico-diplomatic negotiations that would indefinitely prolong the territorial fragmentation of Ukraine may be a less costly option than continuing the war. The use of such tools has already borne fruit in other conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

In such a scenario, difficulties are very noticeable when Ukraine joins regional organizations such as the EU or NATO. Not to mention the economic and time costs of the post-war restoration of the republic, which seems very difficult.

The internal consequences for Moscow of a possible defeat in its “special operation” – the territorial loss of what was achieved in 2014 – will lead to the end of the Putin regime, which will not necessarily mean the emergence of a more conciliatory alternative political leader. For this reason, it does not seem like a very realistic scenario, as it could lead to unpredictable, desperate and radical military actions.

Cracks in the liberal international order

In any case, it appears that the prevailing liberal international order is showing marked cracks, and regional fragmentation is already present. Based on their own values ​​and principles (Eurasianism), revisionist powers of the international legal order such as Russia or China (with other relevant partners) have begun to develop their own agendas and strategic alliances outside of global institutionalism.

The nascent community of autocracies also has an expansionist vocation, penetrating continents such as Africa. The global protection of international humanitarian law, human rights and respect for modern international law is clearly under threat; aggression against Ukraine fully demonstrates this.

Jose Angel Lopez Jimenez, Professor of Public International Law, Pontifical University of Comillas

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original.