Conflict in Sudan: Hemedti, a warlord who created a paramilitary group more powerful than the state

Dozens of people have been killed in armed clashes in Sudan’s capital Khartoum after months of tension between the army and the powerful RSF militant group.

Behind the tensions are disagreements over the integration of the paramilitary group into the armed forces, a key condition of a transitional agreement that was never signed, but which both sides have adhered to since 2021.

General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, better known as Hemedti, is the leader of the SRB and one of the main promoters of the civil war in the country.

The Hemedti Rapid Support Force is led by Darfurian Arabs known as the “Janjaweed”. The term refers to Arab armed groups from Darfur and Kordofan in western Sudan.

Originating from the western edge of the country, they became the dominant force in Khartoum in just ten years. And Hemedti became the visible face of the brutal political climate.

Hemedty’s career is an object lesson in a political career from an expert on violence. His behavior and (for now) his impunity are the surest indication that the mercenary policy that has defined the Sudanese periphery for so long has reached the capital.

Arrival from the periphery

Hemedti hails from the most remote corners of Sudan and is not familiar with the Khartoum political class. His grandfather, Dagolo, was the chief of a sub-clan that roamed the grasslands of Chad and Darfur. Young men from this group of landless and marginalized camel herders have become the centerpiece of the Arab militia that has led the Khartoum fight against insurgents in Darfur since 2003.

Hemedti, who dropped out of school to become a merchant, has no formal education. He was awarded the rank of “general” for his valor as commander of the Janjaweed Brigade in South Darfur at the height of the 2003–2005 war.

A few years later, he joined an anti-government insurgency, forged an alliance with Darfur rebels and threatened to storm the government-controlled city of Nyala.

Hemedti soon reached an agreement with the government. Khartoum paid back unpaid salaries to its troops and compensated for the wounded and dead. He received a promotion to general and a handsome cash payment.

Back on the Khartoum payroll, Hemedti proved his loyalty. President Omar al-Bashir, who ruled Sudan from 1993 until April 2019, when he was ousted, took a liking to him and at times seemed to treat him like the son he never had.

But in the days after Bashir was ousted, some young Democratic protesters who had camped in the streets around the defense ministry embraced him as the new face of the army.

Country in your pocket

Back on track, Hemedty skillfully used his business acumen and military prowess to turn his militia into a more powerful force than the shrinking Sudanese state.

Al-Bashir formed the Rapid Support Force as an independent unit in 2013, initially to fight the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and northern rebels in the Nuba Mountains. The new force took second place. But with a fleet of new trucks armed with heavy machine guns, he soon became a force to be reckoned with in a key battle against Darfur rebels in April 2015.

Following the military intervention of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in Yemen in March 2015, Sudan reached an agreement with Riyadh to station Sudanese troops in Yemen. One of the commanders of the operation was General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who has headed the Transitional Military Council since 2019. But most of the fighters were from RSF Hemedti. This operation brought cold cash straight into Hemedty’s pocket.

And in November 2017, Hemedti forces took over the artisanal gold mines of Jebel Amer in Darfur, Sudan’s biggest source of export earnings. This followed the defeat and capture of his nemesis Musa Hilal, who had rebelled against Al-Bashir.

Suddenly, two of the country’s most lucrative sources of foreign exchange were in Hemedty’s hands.

Hemedti uses a state mercenary model familiar to those who follow the politics of the Sahara. The late President of Chad, Idriss Déby, hired his special forces to fight insurgents from France or the United States in much the same way. It is not surprising if someday RSF troops will be introduced into Libya.

Moreover, with the routine deployment of paramilitaries to fight Sudanese wars at home and abroad, the Sudanese military has become something of a waste project. He is the proud owner of an extravagant property in Khartoum with impressive tanks, artillery and aircraft. But he has few battle-hardened infantry units. Other forces have entered this security arena, including operational units of the National Intelligence and Security Service, as well as paramilitaries such as special police units and the RSF.

feeding terror

But there is a twist in this story. All the rulers of Sudan, with one notable exception, came from the heart of Khartoum and neighboring cities on the Nile, with the exception of Khalifa Abdullahi “at-Taishi”, an Arab from Darfur. His armies formed the bulk of the forces that conquered Khartoum in 1885. The rule of the caliph (1885–1898) was remembered by the coastal elite as tyranny. They are afraid that he may return.

Hemedti is the face of this nightmare, the first unapproved ruler of Sudan in 120 years. Despite dissatisfaction with the Hemedti paramilitaries, he is still considered a Darfurian and is outside institution Sudanese.

When the Sudanese regime sowed the Janjaweed wind in Darfur in 2003, the last thing it expected was for its own capital to pick up the whirlwind. In fact, the seeds had been sown long before that. Previous governments have adopted a military strategy in southern Sudan and southern Kordofan to counter the local population. This was preferable to sending regular army units led by the sons of the country’s ruling class into danger.

Hemedti is this whirlwind. But his rise is also indirectly the revenge of historical outcasts. The tragedy of the Sudanese outcasts is that the man who poses as their protector is the ruthless leader of a roving gang that is very adept at playing in the transnational military market.

Alex De Waal, Research Professor and Executive Director of the Foundation for World Peace at the Fletcher School, Tufts University

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original.